Hardware-based malware detectors (HMDs) are a key emerging technology to build trustworthy computing platforms, especially mobile platforms. Quantifying the efficacy of HMDs against malicious adversaries is thus an important problem. The challenge lies in that real-world malware typically adapts to defenses, evades being run in experimental settings, and hides behind benign applications. Thus, realizing the potential of HMDs as a line of defense -that has a small and battery-efficient code base -requires a rigorous foundation for evaluating HMDs.
INTRODUCTION
Hardware-based malware detectors (HMDs) are an attractive line of defense against malware [1, 2, 3, 4] . An HMD extracts instruction and micro-architectural data from a program run and raises an alert when the current trace's statistics looks anomalous compared to benign traces (or similar to a known malicious one). HMDs are small and can run securely even from a compromised OS-they are thus a trustworthy first-level detector in a collaborative malware detection system [5, 6] and are being deployed in commercial mobile devices.
Evaluating HMDs for mobile malware, however, is a new challenge for architects. Unlike SPEC programs, malware only runs under specific conditions-on real devices in select geographical regions triggered by commands from a remote server. Without a malware benchmark suite, it is challenging to experiment with a carefully diversified set of malware. Further, HMDs have to differentiate malware from benign programs-without real inputs that cover a representative range of benign traces, mobile apps are quiet and HMDs will simply learn to label any computation as mal- ware. HMDs today are evaluated in a 'black-box' manner -without explicitly triggering malicious payloads and by comparing malicious traces to quiescent benignware traces [1] -such that neither malware nor benignware traces represent a real execution.
In this paper, we present EMMA-a principled methodology to evaluate HMDs for mobile malware ( Figure 1 ). As a baseline advance over prior work [1] , we reverse engineer real malware to execute correctly and drive mobile apps using real human input on actual hardware that contains realistic data. We have built a custom record-and-replay framework for Android apps to replay thousands of 5 to 10 minute long user interactions -such as playing Angry Birds or filling out a medical diagnostic questionnaire -correctly. Further, we explicitly model malware adapts its hardware level behaviors to evade detection. To this end, we present a taxonomy of real malware into orthogonal behaviors (and atomic actions for each behavior) and synthesize a diverse range of malware actions.
EMMA helps a malware analyst find the operating range of HMD algorithms. An operating range is a new metric of the form: an HMD algorithm A can detect malware payload X hidden in app Y with a false positive rate of Z. In contrast, HMDs' performance today is quantified using Receiver Operating Curves (ROC plots) that show aggregate true positive v. false positive rates across a suite of malware and benignware programs. Aggregate ROCs are misleading because (a) adversaries can adapt payloads arbitrarily in response to the proposed HMD -hence, operating range is defined in terms of atomic malware payload units instead of true positive percentages in ROC plots -and (b) false positives should be measured using the benign app that malware hides in-comparing to an arbitrary benign app or system utility yields an unrealistic (and better) false positive rate.
We demonstrate EMMA's utility through three case studies that yield new conclusions. Our first case study shows that anomaly-based HMDs, that flag novel executions as malware, benefit from EMMA's characterization of atomic malware actions. Specifically, we find that desktop HMDs designed to detect short-lived exploits are a poor fit to detect mobile malware payloads. Further, small software level actions such as stealing a 4MB photo or one SMS takes 2.86s and 0.12s respectively on a Samsung Exynos 5250 device. Using this insight, we propose an HMD that uses longerduration (100ms) feature vectors and is 24.7% more effective using the area under the ROC curve (AUC) metric than prior work (at the same false positive rate of ∼20%).
Our second case study uses EMMA's malware taxonomy to design effective supervised learning based HMDs, i.e. HMDs trained on both benignware and known malware. We show quantitatively that supervised learning HMDs benefit from training on a malware set that covers diverse, orthogonal behaviors (compared to HMDs trained on a subset of behaviors). Further, the supervised learning model can classify even small pieces of data (1 photo, 25 contacts, 200 SMSs, etc) being stolen with close to 100% accuracy at 5% false positive rate. However, malware payloads such as HTTPlayer denial of service attacks are undetectable at the hardware level-EMMA provides such semantic insights into why HMDs succeed and fail.
Our final case study shows a surprising result-obfuscation techniques to evade static analysis tools make HMDs more effective. Specifically, malware developers use string encryption and Java reflection to create high-fanout nodes in data-and control-flow graphs and thus foil static analysis tools. However, these obfuscation techniques in turn create instruction sequences and indirect jumps that make malware stand out from benignware. Hence, in addition to collaborative malware detectors, light-weight HMDs can complement static analysis tools [7] used by Google and other app stores to drive malware down into more inefficient design points. To summarize, our specific contributions include: 1. Malware taxonomy. We deconstruct 229 malware binaries from 126 families into orthogonal behaviors, identify atomic actions for each behavior, and build a malware synthesizer that incorporates state-of-the-art obfuscation and command-and-control protocols. We find that small softwarelevel actions have large hardware footprints and use this to design effective HMDs. 2. Record and replay platform. We record real (human) user traces for 9 complex and popular applications such as Angry Birds running on actual hardware with realistic data -∼1 to 2 hours for each app -and show that these are very different from traces produced with none or auto-generated inputs. We repackage the 9 benign apps into a total of 594 diverse malware binaries and replay over 4000 minutes of malware binaries to extract malicious payloads' time intervals. We use this platform to evaluate HMD algorithms. over prior HMDs by 24.7%. Supervised-learning HMDs improve by 6-10% if the training set includes each high-level behavior from EMMA's taxonomy, and can detect even small data items being stolen from within complex apps. Finally, HMDs detect what static analyses cannot-reflection and string encryption improves our HMD's detection rate.
EMMA has already informed the design and evaluation of a commercial malware detector and is in use by an external academic research group. We will release the user traces, malware and benignware dataset, and the hardware platform to researchers to seed composable research on HMDs. Before we dive into the details of EMMA in Sections 3 and 4, we motivate our approach by demonstrating how prior 'blackbox' approaches to evaluating HMDs can lead to misleading results.
MOTIVATION
We consider HMDs as part of a collaborative malware detection system that has two components. On the server side, a platform provider (e.g., Google) executes benign and/or malware applications using test and real user inputs, measures performance counters, and creates a database of computational models. On client devices, a light-weight local detector samples performance counters to create run-time traces from applications, and compares each run-time trace to database entries on the device and forwards suspicious traces to a global detector on the server.
HMDs can build databases of signatures of both malware and benign executions [1] or train only on benign executions to flag anomalous executions as malware [2] -EMMA can be used to evaluate both these classes of HMDs. In a signaturebased analysis, the HMD has to compare each run-time trace with the entire database looking for a possible match. In an anomaly detector, each run-time trace purports to belong to a specific app -hence the HMD needs to match the current trace to only that specific app's model. If malware is detected with high confidence, the global detector raises an alert to the user and/or a malware analyst.
Importantly, HMDs' value lies in being trustworthy and light-weight in comparison to software based detectors, e.g., by running in an enclave [8, 9] secure against even user errors and kernel rootkits [10] . HMDs do not need to have 0% false positives and 100% true positives-they only need to serve as an effective filter for a global detector that can then use program analysis [11, 12] or network-based algorithms [13] to build a robust global detector. We refer readers to Vasilomanolakis et al. [5] for a survey on collaborative malware detectors.
Hardware-based Malware Detectors
One line of HMD research focuses on desktop malware which has very different characteristics compared to mobile malware. Ozsoy et al. [3] propose custom hardware signals and hardware-accelerated classifiers and use off-theshelf desktop malware to evaluate their HMD with ∼90% true positive and 6% false positive rates. Tang et al. [2] present an anomaly detector for desktop malware and evaluate using 2 benign programs and 3 exploits, achieving 99% detection accuracy for less than 1% false positives.
To understand how Android malware is different, we compare 20 Windows malware samples (similar to ones in the studies above) to 20 benign programs such as pdfviewer, calculator, filetransfer, resizer, screensaver, etc. We find that Windows malware executed an average of ∼60K system calls within 10 minutes v. only 2.5K for benignware. RegSetValue, the system call used to modify Windows registry, is invoked 820 times by malware and only 72 times by benignware. Further, malware spawns 182 processes/threads on average while benignware spawns fewer than 30. Windows malware have historically targeted gaining control of the machine whereas Android malware rarely attempt system-level exploits. Hence, mobile malware executions are far closer to benign executions. . We present our findings about mobile malware in Section 3.1 and quantify these in Section 5.1.
The closest related work to ours -on HMDs for mobile malware -is by Demme et al. [1] , where the authors present a supervised learning HMD that compares off-the-shelf Android malware to arbitrary benign apps, yielding an 80:20 true positive to false positive ratio. However, this methodology of using off-the-shelf malware and comparing it to ar- bitary benign apps is fallacious, as we discuss next.
Pitfalls in Evaluating HMDs
One challenge in evaluating detectors is that malware developers can adapt their apps in response to proposed defenses. For example, we have found that simply splitting a payload into multiple software threads dramatically changes the malware's performance-counter signature and training a signature-based HMD on the former execution yields a very low probability of labeling the latter as malware.
Further, prior work analyzes malware samples categorized by family-names like CruseWin and AngryBirds-LeNa.Cthis does not inform an analyst as to why a malware binary was (un)detectable. Instead, we propose that determining the robustness of a hardware-based malware detector requires understanding why a particular malware sample was (un)detectable, to anticipate how it can adapt, and then to create a malware benchmark suite to identify the operating range of the detector.
A second challenge is that mobile malware samples available online [14, 15] , and used in prior work, seldom execute 'correctly' (Figure 2 ). Malware often require older, vulnerable versions of the mobile platform, they may target specific geographical areas, include code to detect being executed inside an emulator, wait for a (by now, dead) commandand-control server to issue commands over the internet or through SMSs, or in many cases, trigger malicious actions only in response to specific user actions [16, 17] . 20% of malware executions in Demme et al's [1] experiments lasted less than one second and 56% less than 10 seconds -less time than it takes to steal 5 photos. We posit that experiments should establish that malware does execute its 'payloads' -such as stealing personal information, tracking locations, sending premium SMSs etc -instead of executing a binary on a network-connected machine and assuming that payloads executed correctly [1, 3] .
A third challenge is to ensure appropriate differential analysis between benign and malware executions. Prior work [1] trains detectors on malware executions but tests against arbitrary benign applications. However, Figure 3 shows that Firefox infected with malware looks similar to Firefox itself and still very different from arbitrary Android processes like netd. Further, Figure 4 shows that driving Android applications using real user-input has a major impact on the execution signals compared to giving no input or using the Android 'Monkey' app to generate random inputs. Hence, we propose to test HMDs using malicious binaries against appropriate parent apps while both apps are being driven using real user-inputs.
On Quantitative Comparison to Prior Evaluation Methods. We have shown in this section that prior 'black-box' methods yield traces that do not represent either malware or benignware executions. The prior method has logical flaws -as a result, 20% of malware traces in [1] are shorter than 1 second, and 56% are <10s -and we deliberately eschew further quantitative comparisons with EMMA. Instead, our evaluation focuses on case studies using EMMA to yield new insights into building effective HMDs.
MALWARE TAXONOMY
The first major component of EMMA generates a diverse population of malicious apps. To do so, we first introduce a taxonomy of high-level malware behaviors, and then use it to create a set of representative malware whose hardware signals have been explicitly diversified.
Figures 5 and 6 show our manual classification of malware into high level behaviors. We studied 53 malware families from 2012, 19 from 2013, 31 from 2014 and 23 from 2015 -a total of 229 malware samples in 126 familiesdownloaded from public malware repositories [15, 18, 19] . Our classification's goal is to identify orthogonal atomic actions and to determine concrete values for these actions (e.g., amount and rate of data stolen).
To classify malware, we disassembled the binaries (APKs on Android) and executed them on both an Android development board and the Android emulator to monitor: permissions requested by the application, middleware-level events (such as the launch of Intents and Services), system calls, network traffic, and descriptions of malware samples from the malware repositories. We describe our findings below.
Unique Aspects of Mobile Malware
Our key insight is that instead of trying to detect conventional root exploits [20, 21, 22] , we propose to detect mali- Mobile malware can successfully execute payloads due to vulnerable third-party libraries. In one instance that affected hundreds of millions of users, a "vuln-aggressive" ad-library had a deliberate flaw that led to downloaded files being executed as code [23] . Webviews, that enable Android apps to include HTML/javascript components, are another major source of vulnerabilities [24] that allows payloads to be dropped to a device. Apps with this vuln-aggressive library or Webviews are otherwise benign and can be downloaded from app stores as developer signed binaries, only to be compromised when in use.
In other cases, errors by an app's benign developers themselves can lead to malicious payloads being executed. Misconfigured databases even in popular apps like Evernote [25] and AppLocker [26] (a secure data storage app) were vulnerable to malicious apps on the device simply reading out data from sensitive databases. In such cases, the malicious app could be an otherwise harmless wallpaper app that constructs an 'Intent' (a message) to AppLocker's database at run-time and exfiltrates data if successful.
User errors are another cause for malware payloads executing successfully at run-time. Malicious apps read data from an online server, use it to construct a user prompt at run-time, and thus request sensitive permissions such as access to SMSs or microphone. Users often accept such requests [27] and once authorized, apps can siphon off all SMSs or conduct persistent surveillance attacks [28] .
Worst of all, even the platform (Android) code can have severe vulnerabilities that doesn't require a conventional exploit. For example, the Master Key vulnerability [10] simply involved an error in how Android resolves a hash collision due to resource-names in a binary at install time v. execution time. By packing the binary with a malicious payload such that the install time check passes but the execution time loader picks the other malicious payload, attackers could distribute their payloads through signed apps in official appstores.
Finding: analyze payloads instead of exploits. Based on the above findings, we conclude that while there are many routes to getting a payload to execute as part of a benign app, executing the payload is mandatory for malware to win. Hence our proposed detectors seek to distinguish malicious payloads from benign app executions. The challenge of detecting payloads is that payloads can look very similar to benign app's functionality. For example, if a previously harmless game AngryBirds starts to comb through a database, can we distinguish whether it is reading a user's gaming history (harmless) or a user's password database (attack) using only hardware signals.
In this sense, our problem is a general and more complicated version of detecting exploits -whether Internet Explorer or Acrobat PDF is under a return-oriented programming attack (ROP) followed by Stage 1 shell codes (as considered by Tang et al [2] ).
Behavioral Taxonomy of Mobile Malware
At a high level we assigned every malicious payload to one or more of three behaviors: information stealers, networked nodes, and compute nodes ( Figure 6 ).
Information stealers look for sensitive data and upload it to the server. User-specific sensitive data includes contacts, SMSs, emails, photos, videos, and application specific data such as browser history and usernames, among others. Device-specific sensitive data includes identifiers -IMEI, IMSI, ISDN -and hardware and network information. The volume of data ranges from photos and videos at the high end (stolen either from the SD card or recorded via a surveillance app) to SMSs and device IDs on the low end.
The second category of malicious apps requires compromised devices to act as nodes in a network (e.g., a botnet). Networked nodes can send SMSs to premium numbers and block the owner of the phone from receiving a payment confirmation. Malware can also download files such as other applications in order to raise the ranking of a particular malicious app. Click fraud apps click on a specific web links to optimize search engine results for a target.
Given the advances in mobile processors, we anticipated a new category of malware that would use mobile devices as compute nodes. For instance, mobile counterparts of desktop malware that runs password crackers or bitcoin miners on compromised machines. This was confirmed by recent malware samples whose payload was to mine cryptocurrencies [29] . We did not observe Bitcoin miners until mid-2014 (when we conducted our survey) and used a password cracker as a compute-oriented malware payload. The cracker's task is to recover sensitive passwords by making a guess, compute the guess' cryptographic hash, and compare each hash against a sensitive database of hashed passwords.
Finding: Software-level actions are surprisingly long in hardware. Figure 7 shows the specifics of each malware behavior we currently include in EMMA. Interestingly, atomic malware payload actions take significant amount of time at the hardware level for several payloads -e.g., stealing even one SMS or a Contact requires 0.12s to 0.36s on average. These constants inform the design of our performance counter sampling durations and machine learning models in Section 4. The last two columns in Figure 7 show the average length of an atomic action in the malware payload (not counting delays such as being scheduled out by the operating system), and the instruction count per action (e.g. stealing 1 photo/contact/SMS, clicking on 1 webpage in click fraud, opening 500 connections and keeping them alive in We choose complex apps and include a mix of compute (games), user-driven (browsers, medical app), and network-centric (radio) apps.
a DDoS attack, generating 1 string and computing its hash using SHA1).
Constructing Malware Binaries
We now describe the steps required to create a realistic malware binary. Malware activation can be chosen from being triggered at boot-time, when the repackaged app starts, as a response to user activity, or based on commands sent over TCP by a remote command and control (C&C) server. In all cases, malware communicates back to the C&C server to transfer stolen data or compute results. EMMA's configuration parameters also specify network-level intensity of malware payload in terms of data packet sizes and interpacket delays, and device-level intensity in terms of execution progress (in terms of malware-specific atomic functions completed). We chose concrete parameters for malicious payload based on an empirical study of mobile malware as well as information about benign mobile devices [30] .
The generated malware has a top-level dispatcher service that serves as an entry point to the malicious program; it parses the supplied configuration file, launches the remaining services at random times, and configures them. Malicious services can run simultaneously or sequentially depending on the configuration parameter. In some cases, the service that executes a particular malicious activity can serve as an additional dispatcher. For example, the service executing click fraud spawns a few Java threads to avoid blocking on network accesses. Every spawned thread is provided with a list of URLs that it must access. Besides Android services, we register a listener to intercept sensitive incoming SMS messages, forward them to C&C server, and remove them from the phone if needed. This listener simulates bank Trojans that remove confirmation or two-factor authentication messages sent by a bank to a customer.
Most professional apps are obfuscated using Proguard [31] to deter plagiarism. Proguard shrinks and optimizes binaries, and additionally obfuscates them by renaming classes, fields, and methods with obscure names. We applied Proguard to the malware payloads (even when we did not use reflection and encryption) to make the payloads look like real applications.
After a malware payload is created, it must be repackaged into a baseline app. Repackaging malware into a baseline app involves disassembling the app (using apktool), and adding information about new components and their interfaces in the application's Manifest file. We then insert code into the Main activity to start the top-level malware dispatcher service (whose activation trigger is configurable), and add malicious code and data files into the apk. We then reassemble the decompiled app using apktool. If code insertion has been done correctly, apktool produces a new Android app, which must be signed by jarsigner before deployment on a real device.
REAL USER-DRIVEN EXECUTION
Armed with a computationally diverse malware suite, we now select a similarly diverse suite of benign apps, drive them with long, real, user inputs, and extract hardware signals from them. Figure 8 shows the apps that we selectednotice that we drive real user-level functionality instead of random inputs.
Benign Apps
Our main goal is to choose applications that represent popular usage, and that require permissions to access resources like SD card and internet connectivity. This ensures that the applications are interesting targets for malware. Further, we ensure that the apps cover a mix of compute (games), user driven (medical app, news), and network (radio) behaviors, diversifying the high-level use cases for apps in the benignware suite. Our chosen app set includes native (C/C++/assembly), Android (Dalvik instructions), and web-based functionality, varying the execution environment of our benign app pool. In our evaluation (Section 5), we confirm that this high-level diversity does indeed translate into diverse hardware-level signals.
User Inputs
For each benign application, we created a workload that represents common users' behavior according to statistics available online. For example, when exercising Firefox, we visited popular websites listed on alexa.com. Automating this is simple. For Angry Birds, we recorded a user playing the game for multiple rounds and successfully completing several levels. For the medical diagnostics app (Sana), we record users completing several questionnaires, where each questionnaire requires stateful interactions spread over several screens. Such deep exploration of real apps is far beyond the capability of not only the default UI testing tool in Android (Monkey [32] ), but also state of the art in input generation research [33] . Without such deep exploration of benign apps, the apps' hardware traces will reflect only a dormant app and cause the malware signals to stand out at test time but not in a deployed system.
For each benign app, we collect 6 user-level sessions (each 5-11 min long) and use a heavily modified Android Reran [34] to record and replay 4 of these sessions with random delays added between recorded actions (while ensuring correct execution of the app). These 10 user-level traces per app generate 56-111 minutes of performance counter traces across all apps.
Each benign app is then repackaged with 66 different payloads to create 9 × 66 malware samples. To collect performance counter traces, we replay one of the app's user-level traces and extract 5-11 minutes long performance counter traces for each malware sample. Finding: HMDs have to be application-specific. Interestingly, as we show in our evaluation (Section 5), the compute intensity of CNN and Zombie WorldWar results in them having the worst detection rates among all the apps in our suite. On the other hand, even though TuneIn Radio is more intense than Sana, TuneIn Radio exposes malware better. We find that this is because the Radio has more regular behavior while Sana executes in short, sharp bursts. EMMA's realistic replay infrastructure and user-input traces are key to producing these insights into HMDs' performance in a realistic setting.
Extracting Hardware Signals
We now describe our measurement setup for precise reproducibility. The measurement setup requires careful setup and correctness checks since it is difficult to replay real user inputs to the end once delays and malware payloads are added. Devices. Our experimental setup consists of an Android development board connected to a desktop machine via USB, which in turn stores data on a server for data processing and construction of ML models. The desktop machine uses a wireless router to capture internet traffic generated by the development board. The traffic collected from the router is analyzed to ensure that benignware and malware execute correctly.
We use a Samsung Exynos 5250 equipped with a touch screen, and a TI OMAP 5430 development board, and we reboot the boards between each experiment. We ran all experiments on the Exynos 5250 because some common apps Figure 9 : HMD results for Angry Birds with click fraud operating at three (increasing) intensities. Since HMD is trained on benign AngryBirds, a low dark-line shows that the HMD detects malware as a low probability state.
like NYTimes and CNN crashed on OMAP 5430 for lack of a WiFi module, but repeated Angry Birds experiments on the OMAP 5430 to ensure that our results are not an artifact of a specific device. Performance counter tracing. We used the ARM DS-5 v5.15 framework and the Streamline profiler as a non-intrusive method for observing performance counters. DS-5 Streamline reads data every millisecond and on every context switch, so it can ascribe performance events to individual threads. However, in DS-5 Streamline extracting per process data can only be done using its GUI, forcing us to automate this process using the JitBit [35] UI automation tool. Choice of performance counters. We used hardware performance counters to record five architectural signals: memory loads\stores, immediate and indirect control flow instruction counts, integer computations, and the total number of executed instructions; and one micro-architectural signal: the total number of mispredicted branches. We collected counter information on a per process basis as matching programmervisible threads to Linux-level threads requires instrumenting the Android middleware (i.e., is non-trivial), and perapplication counters yielded reasonable detection rates. We leave exploring the optimal set of performance counters for future work. Ensuring correct execution. We ensured that the malicious payload was executed correctly on the board for each trace. Specifically, synthetic malware communicated with a Hercules 3-2-6 TCP server running on the desktop computer, which recorded a log of all communication. The synthetic malware itself printed to a console on the desktop computer (via adb) as well as to DS-5 Streamline when running each malicious payload.
For experiments with off-the-shelf malware, we developed an HTTP server to support custom (reverse-engineered) duplex protocols for C&C communication. If we allowed malware to communicate to its original server, which was not under our control, we captured network traffic going through the router. We checked the validity of performance counters readings obtained via DS-5 Streamline with specially crafted C programs, which we compiled and ran natively on the boards.
Constructing and Evaluating HMDs
Using benign and malware traces collected as described above, an HMD analyst can then train and test a range of HMD algorithms. For example, Figure 9 shows one of the HMD algorithms we present in a case study in Section 5.1. The HMD is an anomaly detector and the figure plots the likelihood that the current trace is going through a known phase-a low probability thus indicates potential malware (the dark line) while higher probabilities indicate benignware (light gray lines). Increasing the payload's intensity lowers the probability even further. By tuning the probability at which a time interval is flagged as malicious (or by training a classifier to learn this), an analyst can trade-off false positives and true positives.
Importantly, we evaluate true positives and the detection threshold using only the time windows that contain malware payload execution. We do not use time windows where our repackaging code and dispatcher service executes, since we would like the HMD to be evaluated solely using payloads and not exploits. We do not use time windows before or after the payload is complete, because if an HMD raises an alert when the payload is not executing, the alert may in reality be a false positive that will get recorded as a true positive. Prior evaluation methods do not separate out malware payload intervals and may have this error. On the other hand, to measure false positives, we use benign traces only and hence use the entire trace durations for each experiment. Finally, we use 10-fold cross validation on an appropriate subset of our data to evaluate HMDs.
CASE STUDIES USING EMMA
We show how malware analysts can use EMMA through three case studies. (1) We use malware payload sizes in Section 3 to tune the machine learning features (100ms v. subms in prior work) for an anomaly detector HMD. Our HMD out-performs prior work designed to detect short-lived exploits by 24.7% on the area under curve (AUC) metric (Section 5.1). (2) EMMA's taxonomy of malware in Section 3 can be used to train a supervised learning based HMD eficiently. This 'balanced' HMD outperforms alternative HMDs -that are trained on subsets of malware behaviors -when tested on new variants of the behaviors. (3) Surprisingly, we show that our anomaly-based HMD can detect malware that uses obfuscation to evade the best (deployed as well as in research) static analyses. Hence, HMDs and static analyses are complementary and can drive malware payloads towards inefficient implementations.
Anomaly detector using EMMA's taxonomy
We begin by quantifying why prior work designed to detect exploits may not yield the best HMDs to detect longlived payloads. Exploit-based ML features do not expose payloads (Figure 10) . Tang et al. [2] present an HMD specifically deBefore After Figure 10 : Distribution of load/store events in Angry Birds before and after power transform. Power transform does not make malware payloads on Android more discernible from benign behavior, whereas Tang et al. [2] show that it separates exploits from benign apps in Windows. signed to detect the multi-stage exploits that characterize Windows malware. The HMD samples performance counters every 512k cycles, and uses a power transform on performance counter data to separate benign and malicious time intervals. Then, a one-class SVM (ocSVM) is trained on short-lived features -i.e., on each sample as a non-temporal model and using 4 consecutive samples to train a temporal model -to label anomalous time intervals as malicious. We find that power transform does not have the same effect on mobile malware payloads-payloads look very similar to benignware traces even after a power transform. For example, Figure 10 shows the distribution of load-store instruction count per time interval for benign Angry Birds (labeled 'Clean'), compared to time intervals in Angry Birds infected with different malware payloads (e.g., file stealer, click fraud, DDoS, etc)-before and after a power transform. The distributions are shown as a box-and-whiskers plot, where the box edges are 25 th and 75 th percentiles, the central mark is the median, the whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers, while the outliers are plotted individually in red. Data in both plots have been normalized to the range of benign Angry Birds' values. We use the standard Box-Cox power transformation to turn performance counter traces into an approximately normal distribution. Since the distributions of malware and benignware in Figure 10 overlap significantly, training an ocSVM on this dataset will yield a poor HMD as we show next. Payload-centric ML features. We designed a new HMD whose features reflect our findings about mobile malware payload sizes in Figure 7 . Specifically, we attempt to capture program effects at the scale of 100ms intervals, i.e., closer to the time required for atomic actions like stealing information or networking activity.
We then extract features from each 100ms long time interval using Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) and use the wavelet coefficients as a feature vector for the time interval. The wavelet transform can provide both accurate frequency information at low frequencies and time information at high frequencies, which are important for modeling the execution behavior of the applications. We use a three-level DWT with an order 3 Daubechies wavelet function (db3) to decompose a time interval. We also used the Haar wavelet function, but did not observe much difference in the detection results.
Finally, we use multiple feature vectors to construct two models: (a) a bag-of-words algorithm followed by a ocSVM, and (b) a probabilistic Markov model. Both these models are simple to train and compute at run-time, and hence serve as good local detectors (and a good baseline for more complex models such as neural nets that are harder to train).
Bag-of-words Anomaly Detector
The bag-of-words model treats 100ms time intervals as words and a Time-to-Detection (TTD) window as a document. We experimented with a range of words and TTDs, finding a codebook of 1000 words and TTD = 1.5 seconds to yield good results. The bag of words algorithm maps each TTD window into a 1000-entry histogram, and trains a oneclass SVM on benign histograms. We parameterize the oneclass SVM so that it has ∼20% percent false positives. Comparison with power transform | ocSVM HMD. Figure 11 compares our bag-of-words based ocSVM with one that uses a power transform using the area under ROC curve (AUC) metric. Note that AUC is a relative metric to compare classifiers, whereas the operating range measures an HMDs' robustness to atomic-action-sized mutations in malware. The bag-of-words model outperforms prior work for each category of malware behavior and by an average of 24.7% higher AUC across all malware. Operating range of DWT | bag-of-words | ocSVM. Figure 12 shows the operating range for the bag-of-words model. Each cell in the matrix corresponds to a malware payload action (y-axis) and benign app (x-axis) pair. The malware payloads are grouped by category and within each category, increase in size from top to bottom and in delay from right to left. These experiments use parameters from Figure 8 . The intensity of the color -from light green to dark redcorresponds to the detection rate, which is computed as the number of raised alarms versus the total number of alarms that could be raised. Figure 12 shows that the bag-of-words model achieves, at ∼20% false positive rate: 1) surprisingly high true positive rate for dynamic, compute intensive apps such as Angry Birds (99.9%), CNN (84%), Zombie WorldWar (93%), and Google Translate (92.4%); and 2) ∼80% true positive rate In each rectangle, the size of malicious payload grows from the top to the bottom, and the amount of delay decreases from left to right (H=High, M=Medium, Z=Zero delay). If color goes from light to dark within a rectangle, then the detection threshold (i.e., the lower end of the operating range) lies inside the rectangle.
for both Amazon and Sana.
Markov-model based Anomaly Detector
We present an alternative HMD to show that HMD models should be chosen specific to each application, and that there is an opportunity to apply ensemble methods to boost detection rates.
Our first-order Markov model based HMD assumes that the normal execution of an application (approximately) goes through a (limited) number of states (program phases), and the current state depends only on the previous state. The goal is to detect malware if its performance counter trace creates a sequence of rare state transitions (as shown in Figure 9 ).
The HMD uses DWT to extract features as in the bag-ofwords model, but maps them to a smaller number of words (i.e., states in the Markov model) using k-means clustering. We use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) score [36] to find that 10 to 20 states is a good number across all benign apps. Using observed state transitions derived from training data, we empirically estimate the transition matrix and initial probability distribution (through Maximum Likelihood Estimation). For detection, the Markov model HMD tracks the joint probability of a sequence of states over time and if malware computations create anomalous hardware signals (i.e. this probability is below a threshold for 5 states in our model), the HMD raises an alert. Operating range of DWT | Markov model HMD. Figure 13 shows the results-matrix for the Markov model based detector. All the results are shown for a false positive rate of 20-25%.
Increasing the size of each payload action makes malware more detectable -this can be seen as the colors being more intense towards the bottom part of most rectangles. Increasing the delay between two malicious actions does not have a similarly predictable effect -SMS stealers in Angry Birds is a rare pair where detection rate increases with delay. This is interesting since intuitively, adding delays between payload actions should decrease the chances of being detected. However, these experiments indicate that for most malwarebenign pairs, detection depends on how each payload action interferes with benign computation rather than delays between the payload actions.
The most important take-away from Figure 13 is that for most malware-benignware pairs, the detectability changes from light green to dark red as we go from top to bottom in the rectangle -this shows that our malware parameters in Figure 13 are close to the detection threshold, i.e. the lower end of the HMD's operating range for the current false positive rate. There are a few exceptions as well, such as click fraud, DDoS, and password crackers hiding in CNN; and DDoS in Angry Birds, Maps, Translate, and Zombie World Wards. For these cases, the payload intensity has to be increased further to find their detection threshold. Markov model HMD space and time overheads. Markov models representing the behavior of the benign apps vary from 1.2KB to 6.7 KB, with an average size of 3.2KB -they are thus cheap to store on devices and transfer over cellular networks. Its time to detection ranges between 1.2 seconds to 4.4 seconds and about 2.5 seconds on average. This means that the system can detect suspicious activities at the very beginning, considering that exfiltrating even one photo takes 2.86 sec on average.
HMDs should be app-specific
Interestingly, the Markov model works significantly better than bag-of-words for TuneIn Radio -with a 10% FP: 90% TP rate compared to 38%FP: 90% TP rate respectively -but performs significantly worse on apps like Angry Birds. In summary, a deployed HMD will benefit from choosing the models that work best for each application, but due to their different TP:FP operating points, will also benefit from using boosting algorithms in machine learning [37] . 
EMMA improves accuracy of supervised 2-class HMDs
EMMA can significantly improve the performance of supervised learning based HMDs; specifically, by training the HMDs on a 'balanced' training data set that contains malware with each high-level behavior (Figure 14) . Note that supervised learning techniques can be trained to recognize specific families of malware [1] (i.e. a multi-class model) or to coalesce all feature vectors into one label (i.e., a 2-class model)-we evaluate both categories in Figure 14 .
In all the following experiments the number of training samples is fixed to exclude bias from training sets of different size. Each training set is balanced, i.e. contains equal number of benign and malicious samples. The results are computed using 10-fold cross validation.
We experimented with several supervised learning algorithms -e.g., decision tree, 2-class SVM, k-Nearest Neighbor, Boosted decision trees, and Random Forest (RF)-and present the results for RF classifier because it demonstrated the best performance on our data set. In Figure 14 , we present results using ROC curves (left) and AUC metric (right) to compare relative performance of RF under different training and testing data sets. Solid lines in the ROC plot correspond to testing on the same malware type that is used for training, while the dashed lines show RF's performance on other malware types.
The common trend that we observed across all nine apps and all malware types is that the RF classifier has significantly better performance when testing on the same malware types (solid lines are higher than the dashed ones). The only exception is when the RF HMD is trained on DDoS malware, it surprisingly achieves better performance on other malware behaviors than on the in-class malware behaviors.
Further, we trained a classifier on a balanced set of malicious data that included all malware behaviors in EMMA. The solid line with dots (in the ROC plot) and the column on the far right (in the AUC bar graph) in Figure 14 show that showing some variants of each behavior enables the RF to achieve a higher detection rate (on even new variants) 1 than both prior work as well as one-class SVMs. The RF HMD can, for example, detect close to 85% of the malware with only 5% false positives compared to our anomaly detectors' similar true positives for ∼20% false positive rates. Finally, the RF HMD trained on a balanced data set yields 97.5% AUC whereas RF HMDs trained on per-behavior inputs yield AUCs of 91% and 85% when tested against the same or new malware behaviors respectively (averaged across all behaviors).
Operating range of Random Forest HMD. Figure 15 shows the detection results matrix for the RF HMD across the entire malware payload (Y-axis) and benignware (X-axis) categories for a fixed false positive rate of 5%. The key results are that RF detects most payloads except for detecting click fraud and DDoS attacks in CNN, Firefox, and Google Translate. It is likely that DDoS attacks -which involve a sequence of infrequent HTTP requests -look very similar to benign apps and are not well suited to be detected using HMDs. Indeed, all three HMDs -bag-of-words, Markov model, and RF -do a poor job of detecting DDoS attacks in most apps. On the other hand, RF consistently detects information stealers and compute malware (password cracker) across most apps. For apps with regular behavior (Radio) or sparse user-driven behavior (Sana), RF can detect all but the smallest of malware payloads. In summary, EMMA helps an analyst develop a robust HMDfirst by dissecting existing malware to identify orthogonal behaviors, and then by training the HMD on a representative set of malicious behaviors. In the end, using the operating range, EMMA informs the analyst of the type of behaviors the HMD is well/poorly suited at detecting.
Composition with Static Analyses
Reflection is a powerful method for writing malware that evades static program analysis tools used in App Stores today [38] . Interestingly, we show that malware that uses reflection to obfuscate its static program paths in turn worsens its dynamic hardware signals, and improves HMDs' detection rates.
Java methods invoked via reflection are resolved at runtime, making it hard for static code analysis to understand the program's semantics. At the same time, reflection alone is not sufficient -all strings in the code must also be encrypted, otherwise the invoked method or a set of possible methods might be resolved statically.
To illustrate an actual malicious use of Java reflection and encryption, we show a code snippet (Figure 17 ) from Obad malware [16] . The code decrypts class and method names (lines 6 and 10) by calling the method oCIlCll(). As a result, static analyses [12, 39] either do not model reflection or conservatively over-approximate the set of instantiated classes for method_name (line 10) and target methods for the invoke function (line 14). Due to control-flow edges that may never be traversed, static data-flow analysis becomes overly conservative, and static analyses end up with high false positive rates (or more commonly, with malware that goes undetected).
We augmented our synthetic malware with reflection and encryption similar to Obad's implementation. Static analysis of our malware does not reveal any API methods that might raise alarms-we tested this using the Virustotal online service which ran 38 antiviruses on our binary without raising any warnings. Figure 17 shows results of using the Markov model HMD on the 66 synthetic malware samples from Figure 7 augmented with reflection and encryption, and embedded into each of AngryBirds, Sana, and TuneInRadio. We see that in Angry Birds and Sana the detection rate of the malware that uses both reflection and encryption is significantly higher because reflection and encryption are computationally intensive and disturb the trace of the benign parent app (i.e., more than the same malware without reflection and encryption). We do not see the same trend for TuneInRadio because its detection rate was already quite high, so the additional impact of reflection on TuneIn Radio stays within the noise margin. We conclude that HMDs complement current static analyses and can potentially reduce the pressure on computationally intensive dynamic analyses with a larger trusted code base [11] .
CONCLUSIONS
EMMA is particularly relevant to computer architects since hardware behaviors in payloads are easy to obfuscate, whereas malware semantics are forced to be more consistent at the software level. This paper focuses on diversifying hardware signals and evaluating hardware detectors-future work will look into applying EMMA's principles to software detectors.
Our results show that HMDs, just like system call based behavioral detectors [40] , have false positives rates that preclude solo deployment. However, HMDs form a trustworthy local detector that can be isolated from kernel compromises or user errors-our results show that HMDs separate out true and false positives well enough for a global detector to be triggered on-demand and apply distributed algorithms to boost the global malware detection rate [13] .
HMDs complement prior work in static and dynamic analysis of mobile malware. Static analysis research includes analyzing apps' permissions to detect overprivileged apps [41] , detecting malware repackaged in benign apps through pairwise comparison of binaries [42, 43, 44, 45] , or using typesystems [46] and program dependency graphs [47] to detect malware. Dynamic analyses observe an app's run-time data to enforce access control or information flow policies [48, 49, 50, 11] . Aurasium [49] repackages existing apps by attaching user-level sandboxing and policy-enforcement code.
Our future work will include composing HMDs with system call and compiler-runtime based malware detectors. Our approach of identifying why a detector succeeds and fails, instead of black-box experiments with malware binaries, is crucial towards this goal. Indeed, prior work has pointed out the pitfalls of using machine learning in a black-box manner for network-based intrusion detection systems [51]-we provide a framework to conduct evaluate behavioral detectors in a principled manner. Purely machine learning-based ensemble methods to compose weak detectors into one robust detector are also a rich vein of research to draw from [4] .
Finally, computer architects are exploring new hardware signals and accelerators to improve security in general and malware detectors in particular-our work lays a solid methodological foundation for future research into HMDs for mobile platforms.
